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protection of the law to those members of society who are stigmatized
by a past criminal convictions. Although the case stopped short of
declaring that all convicted criminals have a right to the franchise after
release and offered no workable standard for legislatures to follow,
standards might be fashioned from the law available in the area. How-
ever, a state can best serve its own interest and at the same time be free
from any possible violation of equal protection by restoring suffrage to
all prisoners upon completion of sentence. The state, of all institutions,
should not let a citizen's conviction of a crime be prima facie evidence
of his electoral dishonesty.
CHARLES H. CRANFORD
Constitutional Law-School Law-Restrictions on the Infliction of Cor-
poral Punishment: Spoiling the Rod
In the past decade courts have begun to recognize the substantive
and procedural constitutional rights of students who attend public
schools' and to attempt to balance those rights against the effective
maintenance of control and discipline in the educational context. For-
merly courts had vested broad discretion in school authorities to control
and discipline students,2 but with the application of constitutional rights
in the school context3 it has become necessary to examine the discipli-
nary procedures of schools, including possible constitutional limitations
upon the infliction of corporal punishment.'
'See generally Note, The Emerging Law of Students' Rights, 23 ARK. L. REV. & B.A.J. 619
(1970); Comment, Procedural Due Process in Secondary Schools, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 358 (1971);
Note, Emerging Rights of High School Students: The Law Comes of Age, 23 U. FLA. L. REV.
549 (1971).
2See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1924):
[C]ollege authorities stand in loco parentis and in their discretion may make any regula-
tion . . . which a parent could make . . . and . . . courts have no more authority to
interfere than they have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family.
'See Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.
of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961). In Tinker the Supreme Court
held that in the absence of substantial interference with school activities, the wearing of armbands
by students was protected by the first amendment. In the landmark case of Dixon, the Fifth Circuit
held that due process requires notice and some opportunity for a hearing before students can be
expelled for misconduct.
'For the purposes of this note, corporal punishment is defined as the intentional infliction of
physical pain subsequent to misbehavior for the purpose of deterring future misbehavior. It does
not refer to the use of reasonable force as a means of self-defense or for the protection of other
children.
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In Sims v. Board of Education,' a basic challenge to the infliction
of corporal punishment was made. There was no allegation that the
infliction of the punishment was arbitrary or discriminatory,6 that the
purpose of the punishment was to inhibit the free exercise of a specific
first amendment right, or that the particular punishment of the plaintiff
was excessive so as to be cruel and unusual. Plaintiff alleged7 essentially
that "corporal punishment [denies procedural due process because it]
constitutes summary punishment without affording an opportunity for
notice, hearing, or right of representation"' and that" 'corporal punish-
ment is, ipso facto, cruel and unusual'" in violation of the eighth
amendment. The court rejected both contentions. 0
The concept of "cruel and unusual" punishment" is one of the most
flexible in the Constitution since it must be interpreted in light of the
contemporary values of society or, as the Supreme Court has said,
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 2 The standard that has been
developed to determine the applicability of the eighth amendment is a
moral one-whether the punishment is uncivilized'3 or "of such a char-
acter as to shock the conscience or violate fundamental fairness."' 4
Because of the subjective character of the standard, establishing that
corporal punishment or any punishment is "uncivilized" or "indecent"
is difficult, but the history of a particular form of punishment as well
as its application in other contexts is important.
While corporal punishment historically could be applied legally to
a wife by her husband, to apprentices by their masters, and to sailors
and convicts, the school situation is the last area of society where it is
1329 F. Supp. 678 (D.N.M. 1971).
VId. at 685.
7While plaintiff alleged violations of substantive due process, equal protection, and the privi-
leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, id. at 681, this note will discuss only
the most viable allegations-the denial of procedural due process and the violation of the eighth
amendment.
1329 F. Supp. at 681.
'Id. at 690.
IOld.
""[C]ruel and unusual punishment [shall not be] inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This
prohibition has been made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
12Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
131d.
"Williams v. Field, 416 F.2d 483, 486 (9th Cir. 1969).




still extensively used by the state. The anomaly that corporal punish-
ment can still be inflicted only upon students has been criticized by
courts,'" and the use of corporal punishment to control student behavior
has been attacked by many educators.17 The elimination of corporal
punishment in areas other than education is indicative of the general
attitude of society towards corporal punishment and relevant to the
determination that corporal punishment violates the concept of dignity
and the civilized standards of contemporary society.
There is also important judicial authority for the assertion that
corporal punishment in secondary schools violates the eighth amend-
ment. The case of Jackson v. Bishop 8 is, for example, highly relevant,
although the court in Sims declared Jackson to be distinguishable 9
because it involved the infliction of corporal punishment upon Arkansas
prisoners rather than upon students. In Jackson Judge (now Justice)
Blackmun stated that corporal punishment "offends contemporary con-
cepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization which
we profess to possess. '20 This broad characterization of corporal punish-
ment as offensive to contemporary values cannot be ignored.
The recognition of constitutional restraints in the context of educa-
tion requires that courts no longer rely upon the broad discretion of
school authorities as justification for denying the rights of students. It
is not sufficient to declare, as did the Sims court, that the court would
not "substitute" its judgment for that of the school authorities as to
what was appropriate to maintain discipline.22 In addition, since it has
been determined that children are possessed of the fundamental rights
of the Constitution, childhood alone is no longer an adequate basis for
denying rights to which an individual would otherwise be entitled; 3 a
determination that corporal punishment is cruel and unusual in one
context should result, in the absence of substantial countervailing rea-
sons, in a similar determination when that punishment is applied to
children. The historical diminution of corporal punishment as well as
its treatment in the Jackson opinion militated towards a determination
"See Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290 (1853).
"Note, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REV., supra note 15, at 584.
1404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
1329 F. Supp. at 689.
2404 F.2d at 579.
"See cases cited note 3 supra.
"329 F. Supp. at 690.
"See In re Gault, 378 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1967). Contra, Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
638 (1968).
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that corporal punishment in secondary schools violated the eighth
amendment.
It was also asserted in Sims that the imposition of the punishment
without the procedural safeguards of notice, hearing, or right of counsel
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 4 The
concept of due process, like the "cruel and unusual" provision of the
eighth amendment, is a very flexible provision of the Constitution since
the particular procedures necessary to comply with the due process
clause will depend upon the total circumstances and interests of all the
parties involved." In school the student is entitled to "the observance
of procedural safeguards commensurate with the severity of the disci-
pline,' 2 and so the nature of the proceeding required will depend in part
upon the extent of injury to the student. In addition to the character of
the injury to the student, the importance of corporal punishment as well
as the effect of a particular proceeding upon the effective use of the
corporal punishment must be considered. Finally, the availability of
alternatives to procedural safeguards that adequately protect the inter-
est of the student and guard against the potential abuse of authority are
relevant to the determination of what is required by the due process
clause.
In cases involving expulsion or indefinite suspension a formal hear-
ing has been required? The severe social and economic consequences
of an expulsion are the basis of the requirement of a hearing," and since
the consequences of corporal punishment are substantially less severe
presumably a formal hearing would not be required by due process.
Beyond that initial determination, the potential extent of the injury to
the student as a result of corporal punishment cannot be determinative
211[No state shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The actions of school officials are state action under the
fourteenth amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 16 (1958).
The procedural safeguards which may be required by due process can inclkude notice, a
hearing, the right of representation by counsel, the right to call witnesses, and the right to cross-
examination. The inclusion of one does not, of course, necessarily require the inclusion of others.
See R. PHAY, SUSPENSION AND EXPULSION OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS 22-30 (NOLPE
Monograph No. 3, 1971).
2'Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
2 'Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1393 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
2'Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S.
930 (1961).
2Sullivan v. Houston Independent School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1343 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
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of what procedures are required 9 since the exact effect of corporal
punishment upon the student cannot be known. 0 However, although
corporal punishment can be characterized as minor in comparison to
other possible punishments, in the absence of countervailing circum-
stances some form of informal hearing should be required-even if it is
nothing more than an opportunity for the student to explain his conduct
to a neutral party.3
The burden on the effective use of corporal punishment that might
exist as a result of procedural safeguards was a primary factor in the
decision of the Sims court that no procedures were required by the due
process clause. The court took judicial notice that "the purposes to be
served by corporal punishment would be long since passed if formal
notice, hearing and representation were required, ' 32 and the assertion
is undoubtedly true. The imposition of formal procedures would make
the use of corporal punishment practically impossible. However, alter-
natives of less burdensome procedures that still protect the student are
available so that the complete absence of procedural safeguards is not
necessary to the effective use of corporal punishment. Procedural re-
quirements such as administration of the punishment only by the princi-
pal or the presence of an adult other than the party inflicting the punish-
ment do exist,33 and the effective use of the punishment has not been
reduced by these procedures. The purpose of such procedures has been
primarily the protection of the school official from tort liability,34 and
the addition of similar procedures the purpose of which is the protection
of the student from arbitrary or excessive punishment presumably
would be of no greater burden. For example, the requirement that the
"lt is necessary to distinguish between potential psychological or educational detriment to the
student that may result from corporal punishment and potential injury to the student as a result
of the abuse of the privilege to inflict the punishment. While the potential injury to the student
cannot be known in either circumstance, only the unknown character of the former cannot affect
the application of procedural safeguards. The unknown character of the latter strengthens the case
for such safeguards. See text accompanying note 41 infra.
"lt has been argued that corporal punishment produces adverse psychological reactions,
increases delinquency, and disrupts the learning process. Note, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LIB.
L. REV., supra note 15, at 584.
31Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline,
119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 583 (1971).
12329 F. Supp. at 683.
"See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 701 (Supp. 1970): "In cases where corporal punish-
ment is deemed necessary, it shall be administered by the Chief School Officer or by the principal
in the presence of another adult."
3'Buss, supra note 31, at 583.
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punishment be inflicted by one other than the accuser or only after
authorization from a superior would minimize the danger of excessive-
ness from anger that is inherent in immediate punishment, and the
purposes of corporal punishment would still be achieved.
In addition to the burden that formal procedures might have on the
effective use of corporal punishment, the availability of alternatives to
procedural safeguards that protect the student against wrongful inflic-
tion of corporal punishment is important in determining what proce-
dures are required by due process. In the teacher-pupil relationship, the
deterrent effect of possible civil liability of a teacher for a wrongful
infliction of corporal punishment exists as a protection against abuse of
the common-law privilege to inflict the punishment.3 5 However, the
effect on the teacher's behavior of the actual legal consequences of
wrongful infliction is minimal, primarily because of the restrictions that
have been placed by courts or by statute upon recovery from a teacher.
In North Carolina it is necessary to show not only unreasonableness in
the infliction of the punishment" but also that the infliction was mali-
cious or resulted in foreseeable permanent injury.3 1 In other states there
must be "gross abuse" before liability will be incurred,38 or there may
exist a presumption of the reasonableness of the teacher's conduct.39
The result of these limitations is that the student is legally protected
only from an extremely abusive infliction of the punishment. In addi-
tion, the civil liability of teachers only relates to the nature of the
infliction and is seldom dependent upon whether the student's conduct
in fact warranted such punishment. Consequently, although it can be
argued that the potential civil liability of a teacher does protect against
excessive use of corporal punishment, it seldom guarantees that the
student in fact engaged in the behavior that resulted in the punishment
or that such behavior warranted that punishment. Therefore, potential
civil liability is not an adequate substitute for the guarantees of due
process under the fourteenth amendment.
Due process is an elusive concept that is dependent upon balancing
3The deterrent effect of actual civil liability should be distinguished from the deterrent effect
of the threat of being sued and the comcommitant cost of defense, loss of reputation, etc. The extent
of the latter is not known, but it has been recognized to exist. Miller, Resort to Corporal Punish-
ment in Enforcing School Discipline, I SYR. L. REV. 247, 265 (1949).
nN.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-146 (1966).
31Drum v. Miller, 135 N.C. 204, 208, 47 S.E. 421, 422 (1904).
3'E.g.. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.3757 (1968).31E.g., Drake v. Thomas, 310 III. App. 57, 64, 33 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1941).
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all the factors involved in a given situation, and in the case of corporal
punishment it is necessary to consider the potential abuse of the privi-
lege to inflict the punishment as well as the burden of procedures and
the potential harm to the student. An Indiana court has observed that
"[T]he practice of corporal punishment has an inherent proneness to
abuse,"4 and in view of the control that a teacher exercises over stu-
dents, the frequency or severity of the punishment cannot be controlled
by defining permissible punishment as that which is "reasonable." In
Jackson Justice Blackmun noted that such regulations are easily cir-
cumvented and that where "power to punish is granted to persons in
lower levels of administrative authority, there is an inherent and natural
difficulty in enforcing the limitations of that power."41
Requiring authorization prior to the infliction of the punishment
or requiring that the punishment be inflicted only in the presence of
another adult would go far to eliminate the potential abuse of corporal
punishment. The imposition of such minimal procedures in the context
of secondary schools would not unduly burden school authorities in their
attempt to maintain discipline and control among their students but
would be an important step in guaranteeing the full constitutional rights
of those who attend public schools.
JOHN C. LILLIE
Criminal Law-Reflections: Insanity, Bifurcation, Burden of Proof
Can an insane person "intend to commit a crime"? May the state
exclude evidence of his mental disorder at the trial of his guilt? May it
require him to disprove his sanity during the separate trial of that issue?
The threshold question may be answered in the affirmative: In some
superficial sense, at least, insane persons intend the crimes they commit.
Yet the mens rea required for a crime such as homicide has commonly
been supposed to connote something more profound.'
This note will examine these and other questions as singularly high-
lighted in the context of the bifurcated trial procedure. Recent Wiscon-
"Cooper v. McJunkin, 4 Ind. 290, 292 (1853).
"1404 F.2d at 579.
'See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, Comments 1-4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) and
authorities cited therein.
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